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Summary: The basic aim of this paper is to take a tour de force in order to put
the varieties of capitalism (VoC) approach in perspective and to assess its
limits and further prospects. There existed before it a certain stages-of-
capitalism (SoC) approach with a long history. The SoC approach developed
largely under the influence of social and anthropological stage theories of
progress and of Marxism. Accordingly, capitalism as a mode of production was
perceived as progressing through commercial, industrial, and financial stage. In 
this paper, this link will be recovered for the benefit of further scholarship. We
emphasize that the VoC approach, by the weight it puts on efficiency tends to
rank circumstantially the variety at issue, thereby implying occasionally a desir-
able move towards the more efficient form. This means that the elements form-
ing a given variety may actually be matched with the successive stages of a
certain progress.
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Over the past decade, literature on the varieties of capitalism (VoC) has proliferated 
rapidly after the path-breaking work of Peter Hall and David Soskice (2001). This 
promising approach has been deployed extensively for the study of a wide range of 
issues. It is all the more appealing for a comparative study of comparative efficiency. 
In this context, it is no coincidence that the literature has concentrated on the study of 
advanced capitalism pertaining to Europe and North America. Given its short span of 
life, it is not yet certain if the VoC approach will continue to spread in numbers as 
well as in geographical application. There exist two favorable circumstances for its 
further growth: (i) the eminence of heterodox economic approaches that see in diver-
sity a precondition for economic evolution in the wake of the current crisis of neolib-
eralism pace globalization; (ii) the differential advent of countries that participate in 
the European integration where convergence and fine-tuning of economic policies 
take place against a backdrop of variegated institutional matrices. On the other side, 
the approach may well lead to a cul-de-sac where repeated pursuit of comparative 
statics may exhaust the potential of the approach. 
The basic aim of this paper is to take a tour de force in order to put the VoC 
approach in perspective and to assess its limits and further prospects. In a time of  
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profound structural change and worldwide crisis such as ours, this task becomes all 
the more important. There existed before the VoC approach a certain stages-of-
capitalism (SoC) approach with a long history. The SoC approach developed largely 
under the influence of social and anthropological stage theories of progress in general 
and of Marxism in particular. According to the Marx-inspired SoC approach, capital-
ism as a mode of production was perceived as progressing through commercial, in-
dustrial, and financial stage. Whereas the last was identified as the highest stage cor-
responding to the eve of the First World War, the middle stage was identified with 
the European industrialization of the nineteenth century, and the first with the 16-18
th 
century.  
The careful reader cannot help notice the similarity in the above scheme with 
Werner Sombart’s classification of the stages of capitalism (Werner Sombart 1929). 
Not only his conception of the stages of capitalism, but also his characterization of 
capitalism along the bipolar axis of ancient versus modern capitalism make Sombart 
an important milestone in the intellectual history that concerns us here. In retrospect, 
we insist, Historical School approaches (Keith Tribe 2002) to the periodization of 
economic developmental trajectories as well as to the characterization of its various 
stages seem to possess greater historical relevance and validity, and are therefore 
more conducive to contemporary theoretical improvisation and innovation than their 
Marxist archrival. Be that as it may, it was Marxism at large and not the Historical 
School that shaped the intellectual scene of the twentieth-century as a formative in-
fluence. Whereas the influence of Historical School was interrupted by the First 
World War and subsequently by the decline of German as an international academic 
language, Marxism spread far and wide and attained its peak as a formidable force on 
the global intellectual scene circa 1968. What concerns us here is not the intrinsic 
theoretical value of approaches but their institutionalized strength in structures of 
knowledge and the concomitant intellectual gravity-effect. In light of this fact, Marx-
ism scores better than the Historical School and justifies our choice for comparison. 
Furthermore, we believe, the diagnosis for the specific decline and fall of the Marx-
ian SoC approach has important lessons for the prognosis of the destiny of the cur-
rently fashionable VoC approach. Last but not least, whereas both SoC and VoC ap-
proaches restrict themselves to the characterization and periodization of capitalism 
per se, the Historical School identified as its subject-matter the variation of economic 
systems at large the scope of which covered much more than capitalism. That the 
VoC approach can rejuvenate itself by recourse to, and in cross fertilization with, 
approaches that remain heirs to the Historical School will be hinted at the end of the 
paper. In short, the seemingly omission of the Historical School from the following 
part devoted to SoC approach should not mislead the reader to overlook its relevance 
for the underlying argument of the paper. 
As a matter of fact, the VoC approach committed to the vocabulary of “capi-
talism” has been erected on the foundations of, and in response to, the SoC approach 
even though the link seems to have been lost to many a scholar. In this paper, this 
link will be recovered for the benefit of further scholarship. Needless to say, even 
those who subscribe to the same vocabulary concerning “capitalism” differ among 
themselves greatly when it comes to the definition of the concept itself. On the one  
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side there are those who see in capitalism long-lasting and almost transhistorical at-
tributes as manifest in Max Weber’s and Sombart’s notions of ancient capitalism. On 
the other side, there are those who confine themselves to a narrower definition that 
overlaps with the era of modern capitalism. This latter position puts the emphasis on 
the industrial and labor attributes of capitalism that became overt after the Industrial 
Revolution as being of basic importance for the definition. The SoC and VoC ap-
proaches also belong to this second camp. For the greater part of our argument, we 
also adhere to this narrower definition for the sake of convenience. We thus define 
capitalism pace Ernesto Screpanti “as an economic system in which surplus value is 
extracted from the production process by using wage labour and is utilised in the cir-
culation process for sustaining capital accumulation” (2001, p. 258). More summa-
rily, “an economic system can be defined ‘capitalist’ if surplus value is used to sus-
tain capital accumulation” (2001, p. 261). This definition nevertheless accommodates 
a Soviet type regime as also (state-) capitalist: “as far the labour utilization and the 
distribution-allocation subsystems are concerned, state capitalism is a fully-fledged 
capitalist form” (2001, p. 78). In the final part, however, we part ways with this defi-
nition because a long-term approach like the one we advocate suits better with a 
more encompassing definition that also brings with it a significant degree of flexibil-
ity. We have in mind not so much Weber and Sombart’s almost transhistorical notion 
but that of Fernand Braudel which brings to the foreground the financial and mone-
tary attributes of capitalism as having remained essentially constant since the thir-
teenth century; that is, also preserving the historical parameter of the definition albeit 
referring to a longer period of history (1984). Last but not least, we emphasize that 
the VoC approach, by the weight it puts on efficiency tends to rank circumstantially 
the variety at issue, thereby implying occasionally a desirable move towards the 
more efficient form. This means that the elements forming a given variety may actu-
ally be matched with the successive stages of a certain progress. It is in this sense 
that the two approaches are also intricately associated as being fundamentally of 
similar substance.  
 
1. Stages-of-Capitalism Approach Revisited 
 
Stages-of-capitalism approach is founded on the heritage of centuries-long refine-
ment in post-Renaissance philosophies of history that were given a strong touch by 
the theories of progress characteristic of the Enlightenment. Continental philosophies 
circa the French Revolution were increasingly committed to the idea of social and 
historical progress. Scholars adhering to these theories were obliged to adopt a more 
scientific approach that accorded well with a history of the masses that progressed 
according to its own laws of motion. Because the French Revolution was identified 
with progress, it necessitated the characterization of the eras before and after it as 
“stages”. The foundation was laid with Claude Henri de Rouvroy Comte de Saint-
Simon and Auguste Comte’s industry-based societies approach. These stages were 
originally far from being conceived in any relation to capitalism. If anything, social 
philosophers beginning with Saint-Simon and Comte were attracted to the idea of an 
industrial process associated with rapid growth of output and productivity and ex-
plored whether the progress under way could be given a further impetus for the better  
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by human design. Comte, like his mentor Saint-Simon, tried to combine scientific 
practice and philosophy with the individualistic analysis of society. He tried to come 
up with a solution to the tribulations of French society after the Revolution of 1789 
that destroyed traditional sources of authority. According to Comte, France had 
passed the theological phase of law of three stages and was then in the metaphysical 
phase; a period when the investigation of the nature of the universe reigned supreme. 
This stage was characterized by the inevitable questioning of religion and authority. 
Once accomplished, French society would pass to the positive phase that would be 
fully scientific. Saint-Simon and Comte also investigated the industrial system and 
explored the phenomenon of productivity increase in the factory system with their 
main work, Du systeme industriel (1820). They claimed that production and distribu-
tion should be subject to central planning that could be extended to the entire society. 
The next stage should be an industrial society in which even politics should be con-
ceived as a science of production (Tribe 2008). The foundation laid by Saint-Simon 
and Comte was further developed by Karl Marx. His version elaborated a produc-
tion-and-distribution analysis of the economy that shaped society in turn. Once soci-
ety was conceived as an effect of production at large, Marx could easily take the fur-
ther step by deploying the concept of “mode of production” as a combination of the 
forces and relations of production as the foundational matrix of society.  
With the magic touch of Marx and the advent of Marxism in the twentieth 
century, SoC approach came to dominate the scene at the expense of other rival stage 
theories. This was especially so after the cultural revolt of 1968 that brought fresh air 
to the social sciences and humanities. Otherwise, if we take into consideration the 
ontological foundations and properties, SoC approach remains to this day a subset of 
the stage theories of social and historical progress. Though being the exception to the 
rule, SoC approach has had a brief but influential career with a lasting influence on 
the social sciences. This is why we find it worthy of a revisit with an eye to lessons 
that can be drawn from its rise and demise.  
Marx was first and foremost interested in the study of what later came to be 
known as capitalism. In order to understand capitalism better, he delved into its ori-
gins and thereby hit upon the pre-capitalist modes of production. From his work 
emerges a list of modes of production such as primitive communism, slavery, feudal-
ism, capitalism, socialism, communism; and the most controversial Asiatic modes of 
production. The concept of “Asiatic mode of production” was based on a specific 
interpretation of the facts of Chinese and Indian history. Its difference from the feu-
dal mode of production is due to absence of private property and the likely presence 
of a strong, in fact, allegedly despotic state. Whether Chinese and Indian economies 
ought to be identified as “feudal” or “Asiatic” has remained a contended issue further 
politicized by the advent of real socialism (Lawrance Krader 1975; Barry Hindess 
and Paul Q. Hirst 1977). The ordering among the pre-capitalist modes also remains 
ambiguous and debatable. Among all, feudalism remains the best studied mode of 
production. It is no surprise that feudalism is also periodized from within: “it is peri-
odized into successive stages according to increasing privatization of the form taken 
by the relations of production(toward private property) and the increased socializa-
tion of the form taken by distribution (commodity exchange)” (Ben Fine and  
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Laurance Harris 1979, p. 109). These are labor rent, rent in kind, and money rent 
stages. This periodization is based on the legalization of the rent in question. With 
the advent of money rent; the spread of market came to affect economic relations 
irreversibly. Marx was interested in the nature of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism and from capitalism to socialism. Whereas Marx had a notion of distinct 
stages that correlated with successive modes of production, Marxists elaborated the 
idea of stages within the specific modes of production. Nikolai Bukharin (1979) and 
Vladimir I. Lenin (1996) form only partial and halfhearted exceptions to this trend as 
they confronted problems of economic policy-making in postrevolutionary Russia. 
Realities of the backward and war-ridden country forced themselves upon the minds 
of these Bolsheviks. Bukharin in his study of the transition period was forced to ac-
knowledge the “diversity of economic structures” (1979, p. 113) prevalent in the 
Russian countryside: “What we have here is a group of low and low-to-middle ele-
ments in the labour hierarchy, which has no place in a purely capitalist set-up and 
does not represent socialized labour, but is, so to speak, an appendage. Nevertheless, 
its importance is quite considerable, when we examine the social system in its en-
tirety” (1979, p. 114). As far as the kulaks and self-interested peasants were con-
cerned, coercion was “an absolute categorical imperative” (1979, p. 165) for the 
resolution of this “transitional” problem of unwonted variety. In a similar vein, 
Lenin’s New Economic Policy recognized variety of forms from the vantage point of 
practical policy exigencies (Edward H. Carr 1950). If anything, among the Russian 
scholars, Alexander V. Chayanov (1986) remains as a towering figure as he saw the 
true difference of the peasant farm as an economic form with its distinct rationality 
that was likely to persist in the long run.      
In defiance of Marx’s own expectations, as capitalism metamorphosed and 
matured well into the twentieth century, Marxists were forced to adopt a narrower 
focus and concentrate further on its internal periodization. Among the many such 
periodizations, we can remind ourselves of: (1) Rudolph Hilferding’s (1977) stages 
of free trade, monopoly and finance capitalism; (2) in contradistinction, the more 
political formulation in terms of early capitalism, colonialism and imperialism by 
Lenin (1996) and John A. Hobson (1965) need to be noted; (3) Paul Sweezy’s (1970) 
stages of early capitalism “competitive capitalism”, “monopoly capitalism” and 
“state monopoly capitalism”. In a similar vein, Fine and Harris (1979) list laissez-
faire, monopoly and state monopoly capitalism. There exist numerous further varia-
tions to this theme. Call them what you will, the mapping of stages to chronological 
history reveals that they more or less overlap. The first stage is generally dated as 
between the 16
th and 18
th century of European history. It is the stage of primitive or 
commercial capitalism. By the increase of the division of labor, productivity in-
creased and so did production and surplus. It was however in the next stage called 
industrial capitalism, coincident with the first three quarters of the nineteenth cen-
tury, that machines would start to replace workers in the factories while labor-
markets were constituted in an ever growing scale. As of the last quarter of the nine-
teenth century, monopolistic or oligopolistic firms spread under the encouragement 
of the state in both the national and the international arenas. Material expansion of 
the industrial phase was ultimately followed by a financial expansion as of the turn of  
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the century lasting until the First World War known as the Belle Époque (Giovanni 
Arrighi 1996).   
Whereas production is space-specific, finance is the opposite, it is flow-
specific (John G. Ruggie 1993). Given this sharp contrast, industrial capitalism was 
conceived vis-à-vis the territoriality of the nation-state and financial capitalism has 
been conceptualized as essentially disrespectful of national boundaries, that is, as 
potentially globalizing. This enlargement of the field-of-vision requires a new con-
ception of stages with an acute awareness of their worldwide significance. A theory 
derived from the European experience thus comes to be reworked with reference to 
the world at large. Most important is the status of the rest of the world as “develop-
ing” or “underdeveloped” in this context. Marxists committed strongly to the stages-
approach argued that the Third World countries had to follow the same stages in or-
der to reach socialism in the end. Against the above backdrop two debates of broader 
relevance developed. The first concerned the question of whether or not capitalism 
was essential en route from pre-capitalism to socialism. More specifically this meant 
if industrial capitalism could be skipped as a stage. As far as definition is concerned, 
if a stage can be skipped, it can no longer be conceived as a stage, as it is redundant. 
The second question concerned the nature of transition. Does transition from one 
stage to the next come about as a result of internal dynamics or is it initiated by ex-
ternal factors? The two questions are obviously linked in one sense. The more each 
stage is defined as “essential” the less likely that it would generate on its own a tran-
sition from within. With specific reference to the less-developed countries this would 
mean if interaction with a developed country was beneficial or harmful. Ultimately, 
concepts such as “dependent development” elaborated in conjunction with Brazil 
assume a beneficial contact with international capital (Peter Evans 1979).  
As more elaborated modes of production became less receptive to an internal 
dynamics, the concept of “social formation” as consisting of the articulation of two 
or more modes of production was elaborated. As such, social formations bore the 
responsibility for accounting for transitions where the mode of production failed. 
This has one further theoretical implication. Stages are no longer conceived as suc-
cessive as would befit their definition, but as coexistent. If modes of production co-
exist in a social formation, then they cannot be seen as necessary stages. It is no co-
incidence that historicism yields to structuralism with the popularity of the idea of 
social formations as the building blocks of large-scale, long-term analysis. There ex-
ists yet the possibility on another inference. If some modes of production exist side 
by side, then we can speak not of a uniformity and singularity, but variety of modes 
of production at any given point in time. Hereby variety is recognized.    
Within the international arena, Third World countries attracted much attention 
in the postwar period. International bipolarity encouraged both the First and the Sec-
ond World to compete for influence over the Third World. This competition stimu-
lated an academic interest in the economic development of postcolonial countries. 
Walt Whitman Rostow’s five staged take-off model, tailored as the antithesis of the 
Communist Manifesto as obvious from its subtitle, thus became the mainstream clas-
sic in this field. The stages begin with traditional society with a ceiling in agriculture 
based non-scientific production, and reach to the high mass-consumption stage that  
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the societies allocate the increased resources to social welfare and security. Of criti-
cal importance are the preconditions of the take-off. According to Walt W. Rostow 
(1960), the more general case displays the symptoms of an exogenous shock origi-
nating from contact with a developed country. This type of an exogenous shock cul-
tivated the seeds of change in the realm of ideas as well as destroying the traditional 
ways of life, thereby laying the foundations for a modern alternative. Rostow gives 
each stage a duration characterized by investments and growth-rates that need to be 
achieved. It should be noted that industrial production and not finance is the main 
concern in the characterization of these stages. Finally, maturity equated with a mod-
ern technological welfare state will ultimately be attained after a period of fifty to 
hundred years.  
Rostow’s work paved the way for further elaboration of stage theories the 
scope of which was not restricted to the Third World per se. Among these we iden-
tify Fritz Machlup’s (1962) work based on information concentrated on production; 
Daniel Bell’s (1973) post industrial society concept and James R. Benniger’s (1986) 
information society. Finally, with the development of trade, advertisement and com-
munication on the internet, Manuel Castell’s (1996) network society specified the 
next step of these stage analyses. These approaches are based on a common set of 
assumptions. Today, industrial production is spread over the greater part of the world 
and no longer serves to demarcate the developed few. In its place, concern with in-
formation serves this purpose. The West now produces mainly the information which 
is more skill-based. This is reflected at the R&D expenditures, patents and innova-
tions. Now the assembly-line segment is the easiest and less profitable part in con-
trast with the designing, advertisement and marketing segments of the economic 
process. Also the web and the software segment is the most intriguing and continu-
ously expanding sector which has nearly no need of physical investment except that 
of a single computer, yet bring super profits in the short run. Considering these, 
scholars suppose that the next stage will be the information age, where people will 
not produce commodities but information. 
For such stage theories, dating the transitions become the most controversial 
issue. At a national level, validation of the periodization is always possible with 
plausible justification. By the date of an event, by a revolution, by an invention or by 
a legal act, the stages can be initiated. Since we are concerned here with an ex post 
specification, transition becomes a nonissue since it is impossible to claim that it did 
not happen. However, when we attempt to formulate a general theory of economic 
development by starting with an exemplary case, predictions for future cases can be 
misleading.  
The so-called Dobb-Sweezy Debate is the penultimate case in the broader 
transition debates. It teaches us more with its shortcomings than with what it has ac-
tually accomplished. Its objective has been to account for the transition from feudal-
ism to capitalism. On the one side there is Maurice Dobb (1978) working with the 
“mode of production” concept with his focus on English history. On the other side, 
there is Sweezy (1970) who pays greater tribute to the broader context of Europe 
with a depth of focus that takes historical factors into account. Sweezy emphasizes 
external factors such as long-distance trade that helped dissolve feudalism by its im- 
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pact through the towns on the countryside pace Henri Pirenne, whereas Dobb dwells 
on internal factors to do with agrarian capitalism as later picked up by the subsequent 
Brenner Debate (Trevor H. Aston and Charles Philpin 1987). Internal factors are in-
ternal to the national mode of production as a unit of analysis. External factors are 
external with respect to the same. However, they can well be internal to a different, 
more encompassing unit of analysis such as a world-system. Dobb (1978) acknowl-
edged that Italy and Eastern Europe still remained a problem for the debates on tran-
sition just as Maurice Aymard (1982) described Italy as the case that did not fit inso-
far as it hosted all the prerequisites yet failed to accomplish the transition. The impli-
cation is clear. Perhaps we should be concerned not with a transition from one mode 
of production to another at the national scale but with a different systemic genesis of 
capitalism as a world-system as envisaged by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974).   
Let us recall at this point that the ancestor of world-systems analysis had been 
the Latin American Dependency School. Dependency theorists argue that there 
should be another—than mainstream modernization—explanation of the economic 
development of the periphery. Accordingly, development in the periphery is structur-
ally limited and distorted. In fact, one can speak of the development of underdevel-
opment vis-à-vis the periphery as the counterpart of the development experienced in 
the core. This is so because there is always expropriation of the surplus by way of 
unequal exchange between the core and periphery. According to André G. Frank 
(1969), there is a single historical and structural process operating on a world scale 
that produces both economic development and structural underdevelopment as two 
sides of the same coin.   
According to the Dependency approach, contemporary underdeveloped coun-
tries are not at a stage that developed countries already went through. Their underde-
velopment is not the result of their natural autonomous growth, but the effect of their 
contact with developed countries. What is at issue here is more than an initial con-
tact; in fact, a process of inscription into a division of labor that operates at a world-
scale. Moreover, by proceeding further along that path, they increase their depend-
ency on the developed countries, thereby deepening their process of underdevelop-
ment. Dependency theory and its offshoot world-systems analysis thus reject the lin-
ear, staged development. They see peripheral development as an oxymoron within 
the context of the world-system. On the other side, among those who do not neces-
sarily contest altogether the stages-approach, there exist a debate over the nature and 
limits of replicating at present the past developmental experience of advanced coun-
tries. All this amounts to saying that peripheral capitalism is essentially, that is, struc-
turally different. Some argue that, by recourse to right policies, it can be transformed 
into core capitalism while others insist this is impossible. Thus, varieties-of-
capitalism approach was first born in this context. At that time, only two options ex-
isted and debate ensued as to whether the peripheral one would be merely transitional 
or not. We can rephrase this issue in retrospect as to whether peripheral capitalism 
was flexible enough to become normal capitalism identified with the core.    
There had existed for long another criticism of the uniformity-of- capitalism 
approach from within Marxism. We have in mind here Rosa Luxemburg (1951). She 
argued that capital accumulation in a closed system is not feasible. She thus defected  
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from both orthodox Marxist and mainstream commitments to a closed-system analy-
sis. She insisted that capitalism required for its expanded reproduction the presence 
of non-capitalist elements as potential consumers. Implicit in this formulation is the 
conception of a composite economic system greater and more variegated than capi-
talism itself as its Lebensraum. For capitalism to survive, it was thus necessary that a 
country [or the world at large] remains either totally or in part untouched by the capi-
talist system (Sweezy 1970). Once all such entities are inevitably absorbed by the 
system, the impossibility of further capital accumulation will be faced. The result is 
that if every part of the world with their entire population were absorbed into the 
capitalist system, the whole system will be capitalist and closed and would thereby 
collapse. Put differently, capitalism cannot exist in purity. It needs variety of eco-
nomic systems in its neighborhood to survive. Capitalism thus has to be embedded in 
economic variety. This is indeed a strong argument in favor of variety. 
 
2. Varieties-of-Capitalism Approach Visited  
 
Varieties-of-capitalism approach emerged with the publication of Varieties of Capi-
talism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage by Hall and Soskice 
(2001). The book stirred much controversy, exerted influence on the literature and 
resulted in a debate. Thus we will dwell on this work because of its foundational im-
portance. This approach together with the ensuing debate is still less than a decade 
old and remains at a most dynamic phase. Nevertheless, main attributes of the VoC 
stance have crystallized sufficiently to qualify for a critical assessment. The Introduc-
tion to this groundbreaking text states that the approach is “seen as an effort to go 
beyond the three perspectives on institutional variation that have dominated the study 
of comparative capitalism in the preceding thirty years”, namely, modernization ap-
proach, neo-corporatism, and social systems of production (Hall and Soskice 2001, 
p. 2). Accordingly, modernization approach tended to overstate what governments 
can accomplish; neo-corporatism mostly focused on trade union movement and over-
looked the importance of firms in political economy; and despite the recognition of 
the role of regional and sectoral institutions on firm behavior, social systems of pro-
duction approach has not analyzed variations across national political economies. 
Moreover, in each of these perspectives the elaboration of institutions, especially 
their effects on behavior, has remained rather limited, and these approaches have 
failed to capture strategic interactions which are vital for economic and political out-
comes. It is precisely at this juncture that the co-authors part ways “most fundamen-
tally from these approaches” and opt instead to an analysis akin to that of Masahiko 
Aoki (1994), especially with an emphasis on “institutional complementarities” (Hall 
and Soskice 2001).      
VoC is a firm-centered approach to political economy—as firms are seen as 
“the key agents of adjustment in the face of technological change or international 
competition whose activities aggregate into overall levels of economic performance” 
(Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 6). The main objective of firms is to attain core compe-
tencies or dynamic capabilities to develop, produce, and distribute goods and ser-
vices profitably. The co-authors see firm as an institution-taker in general pace 
Douglas North, and strategy follows from institutions. Thereafter, the key relation- 
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ships in political economy are interpreted in game-theoretic terms. VoC approach 
states that firms engage in strategic interactions to reduce their coordination prob-
lems in the economy. Five main categories are picked up as the domain of such prob-
lems. These are industrial relations, vocational training and education, corporate 
governance,  inter-firm relations, and employees. Thereafter, the approach insists, 
“national political economies can be compared by reference to the way in which 
firms resolve the coordination problems they face in these five spheres” (Hall and 
Soskice 2001, p. 8). As Matthew Watson (2003) mentions, this approach “offers 
much in its ability to move us beyond the tendential reification of ‘the international’ 
as a discrete spatial scale of economic activity” and “reminds us that there are par-
ticular geographies of production and consumption, which represent embodied net-
works of economic activity that are limited both socially and spatially” (p. 228). As a 
result of the varieties in institutional context across countries; that is, the role of cul-
ture, informal rules, and history; combined with the effects of institutional comple-
mentarities, we are faced with varieties of capitalism instead of witnessing one-type-
of-capitalism to which all of the developed nations must conveniently fit. 
But what exactly is the variety that is being covered by this approach? Al-
though the VoC stance is ambitious enough to cover also the developing nations, it is 
limited to the developed ones in Hall and Soskice (2001) as it is admitted: “we know 
them best and think the framework applies well to many problems there” (p. 2). Hav-
ing thus practically restricted their scope, the co-authors identify two core types of 
political economy that are liberal market economies (LMEs) and coordinated market 
economies (CMEs). These “constitute ideal types at the poles of a spectrum along 
which many nations can be arrayed” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 8) (see, for example 
Alexander Börsch 2007). By examining the large OECD countries, the writers clas-
sify the USA (analyzed as a case study), Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, 
and Ireland as LMEs; and Germany (analyzed as a case study), Japan, Switzerland, 
the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, and Austria as 
CMEs. Although France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey have ambiguous 
positions, referring to Martin Rhodes (1997), the writers claim some signs of institu-
tional clustering is witnessed in these countries which may justify grouping them 
under the label of “Mediterranean type of capitalism” (Hall and Soskice 2001).  
Be that as it may, let us briefly identify the major characteristics of LMEs and 
CMEs. In LMEs, firms generally solve their coordination problems by relying on a 
mix of hierarchies and competitive market arrangements. Neoclassical economics has 
explanatory power when applied to LMEs (Hall and Soskice 2001). In CMEs, on the 
other hand, firms generally solve their coordination problems by relying on non-
market modes of coordination such as relational or incomplete contracting and 
greater recourse to collaborative relationships. This specification implies that strate-
gic interactions among firms dominate in CMEs and neoclassical economics is insuf-
ficient for understanding them. What is needed instead is a combination of game the-
ory and new institutional economics.  
Having subscribed to the core arguments and principles outlined in Hall and 
Soskice (2001), a number of scholars tried to expand the empirical focus of the VoC 
approach. Some focused on the trajectory of the post-communist countries of East  
23  From Stages to Varieties of Capitalism: Lessons, Limits and Prospects 
PANOECONOMICUS, 2012, 1, pp. 13-36
Central Europe (Iain McMenamin 2004; Stephen Crowley 2005; Magnusn Feldmann 
2006; Buchen Clemens 2007; Lawrance P. King 2007; Lenka Klimplová 2007; Mark 
Knell and Martin Srholec 2007; Andreas Nölke and Arjan Vliegenthart 2009), some 
focused on the Latin American countries (Benr R. Schneider 2009) and yet some 
others focused on the political economies of Asia (Joachim Ahrens and Patrick 
Jünemann 2007; Siri Terjesen and Jolanda Hessels 2009). Among these studies some 
readily accepted the fact that the basic dichotomy between LMEs and CMEs is 
enough to analyze and categorize the political economies in the related geography; 
albeit with occasional refinements as in the case of King (2007) who then re-labels 
the dichotomy as “Liberal Dependent Capitalism” and “Patrimonial Capitalism”. 
However, besides appreciating the usefulness of it, some others insisted on the inclu-
sion of additional core types to the framework as to effectively elaborate the unique 
characteristics of the non-developed political economies. As such, Nölke and 
Vliegenthart (2009) suggest “dependent market economy” as a third type of variety 
to incorporate East European political economies to the framework and Schneider 
(2009) constructs a “hierarchical market economy” to elaborate the distinct Latin 
American variety of capitalism. A number of scholars opposed to the binary classifi-
cation of LMEs and CMEs in order to extend the scope of the VoC approach. For 
instance, Bruno Amable (2003) identifies five types of capitalism by incorporating 
state and politics into the picture, and Robert Boyer (2005) suggests at least four 
types of capitalism by focusing on the crucial differences between the VoC approach 
and regulation theory. These works modify the core arguments of the approach 
which is beyond the scope of this article.     
If we are to turn our attention back to the original conception Hall and Soskice 
(2001), that characterized the forms of variety along a bipolar axis and having distin-
guished between LMEs and CMEs, an important question arises for us: Is one (or are 
some) form(s) superior to the other(s)? There are two ways to approach this question. 
First, the pure types can be compared to each other without focusing on hybrids and 
the question becomes: Are LMEs or CMEs superior? Second, pure types and hybrids 
can be compared to each other. The question then becomes: Are the pure types or 
hybrids superior?   
To elaborate the answer that the VoC approach provides for these two ques-
tions we should first define and underline the importance of the concept of institu-
tional complementarities. As defined in Hall and Soskice (2001) “two institutions 
can said to be complementary if the presence (efficiency) of one increases the returns 
from (or efficiency of) the other” (p. 17). For instance, where systems of corporate 
governance encourage firms to coordinate and collaborate their activities in spheres 
of network monitoring, wage setting, and inter-firm relations in research and devel-
opment; high levels of product-market regulation may be complementary as it avoids 
fierce competition in product markets not to harm coordination and collaboration in 
these spheres (Soskice 1999); or where financial markets are fluid, policies concern-
ing deregulation of labor markets may be complementary and may result in substan-
tial economic gains (Hall and Daniel W. Gingerich 2009, p. 480). The implication is, 
the more successful a political economy is in establishing institutional complemen-
tarities throughout the economy, the more likely that its firms will benefit most from  
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the smoothly functioning institutional framework. The result is more satisfactory 
long-run economic performance. Thus, relying on the concept of institutional com-
plementarities, VoC approach evaluates and determines the superiority of the pure 
types over hybrids by recourse to the role of coherence and consistency among the 
constituent elements.    
Having relied on the concept of institutional complementarities, Hall and 
Soskice (2001) respond to the first question: “although each type of capitalism has its 
partisans, we are not arguing. . . that one is superior to other” as “both liberal and 
coordinated market economies seem capable of providing satisfactory levels of long-
run economic performance” (p. 21). In other words, both pure types have compe-
tence to build up successful institutional complementarities throughout the political 
economy that they can both deliver satisfactory levels of long-run economic per-
formance. However, depending on the distinguishing characteristics of their institu-
tional frameworks, the two types provide different degrees of success with respect to 
several criteria. 
First, CMEs tend to be more successful in providing incremental innovation 
(continuous but small-scale improvements to existing product lines and production 
processes); whereas LMEs tend to be more successful in providing radical innova-
tion (substantial shifts in production lines, the development of entirely new goods, or 
major changes to the production process). Second, CMEs are likely to be more suc-
cessful in providing high levels of quality control; which gives its firms advantages 
over products for which demand is more sensitive to quality rather than price; 
whereas, LMEs are likely to have advantages in products for which demand is highly 
price-sensitive. Third, as far as the speed of technology diffusion isconcerned, LMEs 
should be quicker than CMEs. Fourth, CMEs are likely to have lower levels of in-
come inequality than LMEs and likely to be more successful in providing high skill, 
high wage, and high productivity employment (Hall and Soskice 2001).   
In terms of the second question, concerning the relative superiority of pure 
types and hybrids, as the pure types are more successful in providing a coherent insti-
tutional setup to their firms, implying that they are capable of exploiting the highest 
returns from institutional complementarities, “aggregate economic performance 
should be better in nations whose institutionalized practices correspond more closely 
to relatively pure types of LMEs or CMEs i.e., in nations where market or strategic 
coordination is highly developed in multiple spheres of the political economy” (Hall 
and Gingerich 2009, p. 470). Thus, having made this suggestion, the approach auto-
matically implies that for hybrids, the pure types should be the ideal targets. Al-
though not examined by Hall and Soskice, some scholars who adhere to VoC ap-
proach argue that a “dual convergence” is on the agenda, meaning that “convergence 
takes place within clusters but not between them” (Chris Howell 2003).  
The convergence/transition debate discussed in Hall and Soskice (2001) re-
flects one of the most crucial points where the VoC stance differentiates itself from 
the mainstream orthodoxy and puts forward its core arguments. It would have been 
better if the authors crystallized their position in accordance with the lessons of the 
broader convergence literature that distinguishes among “absolute”, “conditional” 
and even “club” convergence. The latter two cases are all the more relevant for the  
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authors’ purpose as they take initial conditions including culture, institutions, and 
geographical position into account. Whereas the “conditional convergence” hypothe-
sis claims that given common structural characteristics, a convergence will take place 
in the long run independently of initial conditions, “club convergence” hypothesis 
expects this to happen only if the initial conditions are similar as well (Oded Galor 
1996). Differentiation of the rival positions along these lines would have made this 
debate more productive. Be that as it may, mainstream orthodoxy, mainly relying on 
the tools of neo-classical economics, constructs an “ideal type”, a “best practice” 
which represents the only natural and rational outcome of the organization of an 
economy. All political economies other than the “best practice” are expected to con-
verge to it, unless there exist irrational external forces. This “best practice” is akin to 
the LME of the VoC approach and the result is a certain predetermined unity instead 
of variety. The VoC framework directly opposes to the idea of “best practice” and 
the corresponding convergence argument. As stated, the approach constructs a sec-
ond pure type (CME) that can provide satisfactory levels of long-run economic per-
formance like its LME counterpart by establishing a coherent institutional framework 
with its own “rules of the game” and rationality. Thus, efficiency considerations do 
not imply the convergence of CMEs to LMEs. To put forward and justify their argu-
ments, Hall and Soskice (2001) elaborate the convergence debate of CMEs to LMEs 
in a detailed way by examining the catalysts and impediments of it. They first intro-
duce the arguments of the mainstream orthodoxy favoring convergence; then, they 
construct their own arguments.  
The first and foremost catalyst of the convergence of CMEs to LMEs is the 
pressure of globalization and the argument evolves around three suggestions (Hall 
and Soskice 2001). First, in terms of basic structure and strategy, firms are seen as 
very similar across nations implying that regardless of the national political econo-
mies in which they operate, firms will react very similarly to the same external 
shocks and disturbances. Second, the competitiveness of firms are measured relying 
on their labor costs, thus, if firms get a chance to reduce the costs by shifting their 
production abroad, they will take it. Third, as international interdependence will fa-
vor capital as it has more exit opportunities than labor; governments will implement 
several “firm-friendly” policies in order not to undermine production and overall 
economic activity. In short, governments will behave in line with the requirements of 
globalization.   
The second catalyst which is directly related with the first one is the altered 
structure of the market for corporate governance caused by globalization (Hall and 
Soskice 2001). In an environment where internalization of finance takes place—there 
is a substantial increase in the international flows of capital both in terms of direct 
and portfolio investment—firms of CMEs need to restructure their traditional prac-
tices in order to attract foreign investors and to increase their shares in the world 
market. In line with the demands of these investors such as the opportunity to moni-
tor the progress of a company closely, insistence on a transparent balance-sheet crite-
ria, or to have a chance to engage in merger or acquisition activity like in LMEs, 
firms of CMEs will have to take reactive steps to resemble their LMEs counterparts, 
such as revising their accounting standards or appointing independent directors.  
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More importantly, as a direct implication of this kind of resemblance, firms of CMEs 
will have to consider the rate of return of their capital or their share price; a factor not 
much considered previously. Keeping in mind the argument of institutional comple-
mentarities, these developments may alter the other relevant institutions across the 
political economy and the disturbance may eventually lead to further convergence. 
For instance, referring to Aoki (1994), Hall and Soskice (2001) argue, “if the finan-
cial markets of a CME are deregulated . . . it may become more difficult for firms to 
offer long-term employment. That could make it harder for them to recruit skilled 
labor or sustain worker loyalty, ultimately inspiring major changes in production re-
gimes” (p. 64).      
The counterarguments of Hall and Soskice (2001) developed against the con-
vergence scenario help us identify the core elements of the impediments to transition. 
First, the suggestion that firms across nations are similar is inadequate. Relying on 
the distinguished institutional characteristics of LMEs and CMEs, firms of each type 
will engage in different strategic interactions as to benefit most from the institutions 
they face and the result will accordingly be “firms in different types of economies 
react differently to similar changes” (Hall and Soskice 2001, p. 56, by referring to 
Michael Knetter 1989). Second, although low labor-costs are always attractive to 
firms, it does not necessarily result in the relocation of their production abroad, as 
what is more important than low costs of labor is the favorability of the institutional 
setup. In short, the existing institutional structure of CMEs is the most important im-
pediment to convergence towards LMEs. Faced with the pressures of globalization, 
either pure type will tend to develop different policies in order not to damage the co-
herence of its own institutional framework, by relying on which, their firms organize 
their activities in turn (Hall and Soskice 2001) (see, for example Hall 2007).   
In terms of the transition of hybrids to the pure types, Hall and Soskice put 
pure types as targets due to efficiency concerns as we have stated. However, we 
know all too well that efficiency considerations as such do not automatically generate 
institutional change. Referring to Kathleen Thelen (2001), Hall and Soskice (2003) 
admit that “although efficiency considerations. . . are relevant to institutional change, 
the latter is ultimately political process driven by many factors and must be analyzed 
as such” (p. 245). Thus, it is fair to suggest that while mainstream economics claims 
the existence of a “best practice” to which all of the political economies tend to con-
verge, the VoC approach emphasizes the existence of two “best practices” (LME and 
CME) to which hybrids tend to converge when liberated from the pressure of politi-
cal process. Consequently, the aim of the VoC stance is to provide a theoretical basis 
to explain the dualist nature of capitalism implying the shift from unity to variety.    
However, a closer investigation may undermine the very duality that the VoC 
stance aims to end up with. Having elaborated and in turn appreciated variety relying 
on efficiency considerations, the approach introduces LMEs and CMEs as a terminus 
for all political economies. The former, which corresponds to the “best practice” of 
the mainstream economics, has a solid theoretical and practical background. Its defi-
nition, identification and elaboration are crystal clear. The latter, on the other hand, 
seems to be ambiguous as it excessively relies on the “historically-specific” German 
case for its characterization. If only the Iron Curtain had contained not part but the  
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whole of Germany, France would have been taken up as the model for CME. With 
the Eastern European countries now being incorporated into the domain of discus-
sion, the model-case may have to shift. Consequently, the attempt of making a gener-
alization with special reference to this unique circumstance to construct a pure type is 
far from satisfactory. On the one end is a stable equilibrium and on the other an un-
stable one defined by accidental circumstances and merely statistical properties. This 
is indeed an asymmetric formulation as far as the two endpoints are concerned. From 
our perspective, the main problem lies in the way that variety is treated in the VoC 
approach; a treatment that solely depends on efficiency considerations and does not 
genuinely appreciate variety itself.  
Several scholars of the VoC approach have also questioned the stability of the 
pure types they constructed and came up with similar inferences. For instance, con-
cerning the “hierarchical market economies” built up to explain the distinctive char-
acteristics of the Latin American variety of capitalism, Schneider (2009) admits 
“some recent developments in Latin America—growing stock markets, for exam-
ple—may gradually displace more hierarchical corporate governance” (p. 571) by 
altering the very foundations of this variety; and concerning the “dependent market 
economies” constructed to explain the third type of East and Central European politi-
cal economies, Nölke and Vliegenthart (2009) admit “it is perhaps still too early to 
judge the long-term stability of this variety and its ability to provide an equal alterna-
tive to CMEs and LMEs” (p. 676).             
If we are to further our discussion of the transition debate,—setting aside those 
who suggest a third variety to capture the specific characteristics of the non-
developed political economies (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Schneider 2009) - the 
VoC scholars provide contradictory conclusions concerning the transition of hybrids 
to the pure types. Especially, the political economies of East and Central Europe at-
tracted much attention in the literature as they constitute stirring “large scale experi-
ments” (Feldmann 2007, p. 328) to test and expand the empirical focus of the ap-
proach due to their highly comparable historical backgrounds and concurrent transi-
tion experiences. A part of these studies suggested the transition of East and Central 
European countries to LMEs (Crowley 2005), another part to CMEs (McMenamin 
2004), and yet another part to none as these countries are regarded as stable hybrids 
or their transition path is described as being unclear (Klimplová 2007). One might 
blame the “premature, mechanistic preference for quantitative approaches” in the 
occurrence of this contradictory picture as “many studies simply take the basic char-
acterization of the two dominant models of political economy (CME and LME) as a 
given and apply their conventional categories to the economies of ECE (East Central 
Europe)” without considering the fact that “statistical correlations as such do not 
necessarily imply causal interrelationships between the institutional elements in-
volved” (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009, p. 672). Moreover, the reduction of the five-
sphere focus of the VoC stance to only one “may also lead to problematic conclu-
sions because a narrow focus does not allow for an identification of the quintessential 
interdependencies between different institutions within one capitalist model” (Nölke 
and Vliegenthart 2009, p. 672). From our perspective this suggestion is incomplete if 
not inadequate. As will be claimed, the same preference for quantitative approaches  
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coupled with the quest for efficiency not only results in contradictory conclusions in 
terms of the transition debate; but also introduces more serious problems concerning 
the entire understanding and conceptualization of the VoC approach.     
Having thus discussed the transition/convergence debate of the various types, 
we ought now to address the ultimate question of whether variety is truly seen as de-
sirable by the VoC approach. In light of our reading of the literature, notwithstanding 
the basic two pure types, variety is not really desirable in the VoC approach, in the 
sense that hybrids are not seen as efficient as their pure counterparts. To be sure, for 
an approach which attributes institutions a crucial role in its analysis but defines 
them in a narrow sense and takes them into account only when they alter the “rules of 
the game” and affect the “rational” behavior of firms in game-theoretic terms, effi-
ciency considerations are all important. As we stated, the major obstacle for the tran-
sition from hybrids to the pure types is attributed to political factors (Hall and 
Soskice 2003). Thus, if only economists had a chance to remove these obstacles in 
order to benefit most from the fruits of efficiency, they would certainly do that. 
Moreover, not surprisingly, we have not so far come across a single statement in the 
existing VoC literature that genuinely appreciates the existence of variety. As stated 
by Hall and Soskice (2003), the VoC approach is not interested in explaining the ori-
gins of institutions and institution-building is seen by the co-authors as an essentially 
political project.  
The VoC approach suffers from a number of additional inherent weaknesses. 
It focuses only on the postwar experience of the developed First World nations. By 
so doing, it takes capitalism as given. Within such a limited domain, when the rules 
of rationality and efficiency are set in motion as the determinant of outcomes, then 
the value and desirability of variety inevitably vanishes from the scene. This is not 
the only criticism to which the VoC approach is subjected. For instance, Howell 
(2003) emphasizes the underrated role of state and labor in political economy; Am-
able (2003) points out the deficiencies of the one-dimensional focus—that that is, 
coordination - of the approach; Boyer (2005) stresses the importance of the “primacy 
of systemic and macroeconomic coherence” over “private firm governance”; Watson 
(2003) criticizes the application of Ricardian themes to the analyses; and Pernilla S. 
Rafiqui (2010) argues the approach should also consider variety within nations in line 
with the suggestions of economic geography. Besides such other lesser reasons,
 this 
is why we need a more comprehensive approach in its place. An approach that has 
explanatory power when types of economic systems other than capitalism are also 
taken into consideration has much more to offer us especially when the time horizon 
in extended. When liberated from the “divine” conceptions of rationality and effi-
ciency, such an approach will also enlarge the role attributed to institutions. We 
ought to be more concerned about varieties of economic systems instead of varieties 
of capitalism in order to improve our understanding of the institutional nature of po-
litical economic change. 
 
3. Lessons and Prospects 
 
The better examples of the critique of SoC approach are found in the now-classic 
works of Karl Polanyi (1944), Alexander Gerschenkron (1962), Wallerstein (1974) 
and Fernand (1982) which inspire our position below.  
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The first blow to SoC approach came from within academic economic history 
when Gerschenkron parted ways with the dominant view that envisaged only one 
type of economic development: “it is fair to say that for Rostow, as for List and 
Schmoller, there is only one type of economic development” (1968, p. 79). Marx was 
also in the same camp as were his disciples as they subscribed to “the grand Marxian 
generalization according to which it is the history of advanced or established indus-
trial countries which traces out the road of development for the more backward coun-
tries” (Gerschenkron 1962, p. 6). Gerchenkron distanced himself from this position 
by underlining the fact that “in several important respects the development of a 
backward country may, by the very virtue of its backwardness, tend to differ funda-
mentally from that of an advanced country” (1962, p. 7). When Gerschenkron probed 
deeper than his Marxist rivals into the specificities of European (“capitalist”) indus-
trialization in the nineteenth century, he discovered that different forms of industri-
alization tracing distinct paths that culminated in different economic structures coex-
isted. In order to achieve industrialization, those who come late could innovatively 
substitute for the missing preconditions by the application of “institutional instru-
ments”, thereby benefitting from the so-called latecomer’s advantage in order to suc-
ceed in their pursuit. As he put it: “economic life is pregnant with many alternative 
solutions, so that in countries where the so-called prerequisites were not present, 
various substitutions for them have been developed in the very course of industrial 
development” (1968, p. 132). In fact, “the preindustrial landscape of backward coun-
tries was rather barren, and the history of their industrializations much more complex 
and variegated, precisely because it was shot through and dominated by substitutions 
of many kinds” (1968, p. 136). Implicit in Gerschenkron’s recognition of the possi-
bility of such a substitution is that there exists a certain flexibility of economic struc-
tures, or more specifically “productive and organizational structures of industry” 
concerned (1962, p. 7). Moreover, while most of these alternative forms succeeded in 
achieving industrialization, the resulting economic structures were not the same; 
hence industrial variety was not transitional but lasting. The second blow was the 
scholarly discovery of a “Financial Revolution” on the eve of British industrializa-
tion that disrupted the expected sequence of progress (Braudel 1984). The third blow 
was due to the recognition of the actually “industrial” and “capitalist” nature of plan-
tation economies that characterized the first stage that was allegedly commercial. As 
Braudel (1982) put it, plantations were “capitalist creations par excellence” (p. 272). 
It is no coincidence that developments in economic history mobilized a theoretical 
revisionism against the SoC approach.  
Instead of facing these challenges head on, how the SoC approach chose to 
undermine itself by way of further sophistication-cum-obfuscation, thereby cultivat-
ing a heresy is best caricatured unintentionally in Melotti’s long-forgotten book, 
Marx and the Third World (1977) that depicted graphically the labyrinthine paths of 
transition allegedly wide open to a social formation. 
Had it not been for the recognition of the world-systemic nature of capitalism 
pace Wallerstein, we would have been lost in the above labyrinth. Fortunately, we 
should remind ourselves that the SoC approach, as it spread in scale and scope, had  
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Source: Umberto Melotti (1977, p. 26). 
 
 
already attained a global character via the dependency approach. As history moved 
ahead, so did the scale and scope of capitalism, so as to impose a certain uniformity 
on the world. This most mature form nevertheless moved beyond the original uni-
formity and emphasized instead a duality counterpoising core and periphery. Already 
at this point, (a two-element) variety was rediscovered after a long route. As a matter 
of fact, the idea of a variety as a condition of existence for capitalism was already 
contained in Luxemburg’s nonmainstream Marxism. In retrospect, we identify that 
the interaction of the capitalist and non-capitalist elements as complementary of one 
another in Luxemburg’s approach contain the seeds of the “institutional complemen-
tarity” so dear to advocates of the VoC approach; a theme to which we will return at 
the very end of this paper. In short, SoC started from the premise of a uniform notion 
of capitalism only to discover by default that this was not so. The further enrichment 
of this variety had to await the VoC approach. As focus shifted from the whole to its 
increasingly minute parts, variety proliferated albeit for a limited time, because of the 
eventual convergence expectations. Yet this came at a heavy price; that is, the long-
view, and the macro dynamics of the historical trajectory were lost. It is no coinci-
dence that the VoC approach performs best in the study of small-scale, short-term 
quasi-static comparisons. This is also why unquestioningly coming under the influ-
ence of the winds of globalization, VoC approach has been tempted to see transition 
from one particular variety to another as more likely or desirable. This means tracing 
the reverse path to that of SoC approach as it sets out to elaborate the implications of 
variety only to rediscover en route uniformity by default. In order to perform equally 
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well at the larger-scale, longer-term domain, VoC approach needs to be reinvested 
with some of the lessons of the SoC approach as well as drawing upon the heritage of 
a critique of the SoC approach based upon the works of Polanyi, Gerschenkron, 
Braudel and Wallerstein among others.    
The VoC approach has centered its attention on the firm as the most important 
single institution responsible for the characterization of the varieties of capitalism. 
Just as the SoC approach was based on the primacy of production as best represented 
by the factory, VoC approach tries to generalize by starting with the firm as the rep-
resentative institution of capitalism. This may be a better choice, but one lesson of 
the SoC approach was the highly misleading association of modes of production with 
ideal sites of production such as the factory and the manor.   
One major problem with SoC approach was that it was based on a standard-
ized notion of capitalism the comparable counterparts of which were sought in his-
tory as a finite number of modes of production. As the number of modes of produc-
tion increased, transition became less and less likely and the necessary stages all the 
more disputable. Ultimately, refuge to the idea of a social formation as consisting of 
co-existent modes of production made transition all the less comprehensible. In con-
trast, VoC approach started with identifying forms of capitalism as manifest in actual 
contexts. This meant not only taking capitalism for granted without actually defining 
it but also externalizing capitalism under the rubric of the “globalization” thrust. In 
this way, we are sent back to Sweezy’s conception of transition as largely the result 
of exogenous factors. It is ironical that an approach that tries to emphasize the capi-
talist nature of variety succumbs to a position that actually externalizes the operation 
of capitalist dynamics on a grand scale. The Achilles’ heel of the VoC approach is 
that it confuses the essence and form of capitalism and loses sight of the fact that 
there is one and only one capitalism that takes different forms depending on the his-
torical and institutional contexts in which it manifests itself. As Screpanti put it, “We 
need a theory which is general enough to encompass all possible forms of capitalism, 
but at the same time, flexible and complex enough to accommodate many idiosyn-
crasies.” (2001, p. 256). Moreover, “It is possible for a mode of production to remain 
unaltered in its fundamental characteristics, and yet take different specific forms.” 
(2001, p. 258). In his dual critique of the mainstream conception of capitalism and 
stages, Braudel made this clear. He identified as the essential characteristic of capi-
talism that bestows upon it a certain unity across time and space “its unlimited flexi-
bility, its capacity for change and adaptation” (Braudel 1982, p. 433). Braudel in-
sisted: “On a world scale, we should avoid the over-simple image often presented of 
capitalism passing through various stages of growth, from trade to finance to indus-
try—with the ‘mature’ industrial phase, as in the so-called industrial phase (and both 
terms cover a multitude of forms)” (Braudel 1982, p. 433).           
Without this notion of an all-encompassing capitalist dynamics, we are left in 
the obscure with the ambiguous notion of varieties of capitalism. The limits of the 
perspective become all the more clear when cases like contemporary China that can-
not conveniently be classified as capitalist force themselves upon us (Arrighi 2007, p. 
24). In order to comprehend this case, we need to approach with a broader perspec-
tive that tolerates variety not only within but also beyond capitalism. It may well be  
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that even if there is a convergence trend among European and North American cases, 
this may not be reflective of a global reality; that is, variety might simultaneously be 
forcefully being reproduced at a global level.   
Be that as it may, a more inclusive varieties approach would further require 
that we move beyond the singular myopic focus on capitalism and distinguish instead 
between market and capitalism pace Braudel. This distinction is most explicit in 
Braudel who concentrated his attention on the further specification of both catego-
ries. In Polanyi, the same distinction also exists albeit in a disguised form. Polanyi 
concentrated his investigation on the further analysis of the market system. However 
his specification of haute finance as an institution par excellence of capitalism and as 
distinct from and external to the market ought not to be overlooked (Polanyi 1944). 
In this sense, his framework of analysis is compatible with that of Braudel. Yet once 
this distinction is made, we cannot content ourselves with the tools derived from the 
analysis of (narrowly-conceived commodity-) market economies be they of the neo-
classical or new institutional kind. This brings us to the scheme of analysis by re-
course to the concepts of reciprocity, redistribution and exchange that Polanyi invited 
us to elaborate. Polanyi (1957) noted that market categories would mislead us to un-
derstand nonmarket economic systems and insisted that we needed a broader frame 
of reference with its own proper analytical tool box than that of the market, in order 
to evaluate the specificity of the market against a historical backdrop. 
Polanyi (1957) emphasized that these forms of integration coexisted in differ-
ent combinations and in no way implied either stages or progress. This approach rids 
us of the major shortcomings of the SoC approach as it was originally intended for. 
However, it also has much to offer in order to lead the VoC approach out of its cul-
de-sac into a broader domain that not only tolerates but also welcomes variety as 
would befit a truly institutionalist approach. One important characteristic of contem-
porary institutionalism is the role attributed to the so-called impurity principle. As 
Screpanti stated “Impurities cannot be ignored when accounting for historical evolu-
tion, since they produce the variability through which competitive evolution drives 
institutional change.” (2001, p. 267). Accordingly, in order for an economic system 
to function, different subsystems are needed. How these are actually combined de-
termine “the nature of the specific variety of capitalist system” (Geoffrey Hodgson 
2002, p. 213). The implication is clear: “An immense variety of forms of any given 
socio-economic system can exist.” (Hodgson 2002, p. 213). We hereby recognize the 
textual richness of true variety that remains way beyond either the SoC or the VoC 
approaches. 
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